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Abstract 
 
This paper uses the Management and Employee Questionnaires from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations 
Survey (WERS98) to consider whether the performance of workplaces which offer a range of family-friendly 
policies are superior to that of workplaces without such practices.  It is found that in almost all cases where there 
is a significant relationship between the use of a family-friendly practice and workplace performance, this 
relationship is positive.  In addition, it appears that workplaces which offer an extensive range of family-friendly 
policies are much more likely to have above-average performance than those with no such practices.  The paper 
moves on to consider whether employers offering policies which enable employees with families to maintain a 
full-time presence in the workplace e.g. a workplace nursery, have better performance than those which offer 
policies which result in reduced-visibility e.g. working from home, part-time work.  The evidence from 
WERS98 suggests that this is indeed the case. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Girls outperformed boys at both GCSE and A-level for the first time in 2000, and this pattern 
was repeated in 2001 (Smithers, 2000:  9; Joint Council for General Qualifications, 2000; 
2001).  Although a slightly larger proportion of male undergraduates gained first class 
degrees in the most recent year for which data is available (2000), more first class degrees 
were awarded to women.  Combining the proportion of undergraduates gaining first, or upper 
second degrees, 54 per cent of women attained a degree in the top two categories, against 47 
per cent of men.  At the other end of the spectrum, 18 per cent of male undergraduates 
received third class, or pass degrees as opposed to 13 per cent of women (Higher Education 
Statistics Agency, 2001).   
The ability of women to outperform men in gaining academic qualifications suggests 
the possibility that they may also outperform men in the workplace.  However, it might be 
expected that if women bear the main responsibility for the family, or face discrimination in 
the workplace, the performance benefits from having better-educated female employees 
would be lost.  Gershuny suggests that the dual burden of paid and unpaid work for women 
might persuade them to leave paid work, or work shorter paid hours, so that their human 
capital is depleted relative to that of men.  Over the longer-term, this means that women are 
less likely to move into better jobs (Gershuny, 1997:  141, 146).  Whilst there is some 
evidence that men now undertake a greater share of unpaid work, the 1995 British Household 
Panel Survey demonstrated that where a husband and wife were both in full-time 
employment, the wife did nine hours a week more housework, not including time spent on 
childcare (Gershuny, 1997:  144, 148).  For this reason, policies aimed at reducing the 
disadvantage that women experience in the workplace due to their responsibilities outside 
work, might be expected to have a positive impact on performance.  However, to date there 
has been little research on the links between family-friendly policies and performance.  
Therefore, this paper seeks to address the question of whether workplaces making greater 
provision for those with family responsibilities do indeed experience enhanced performance. 
Whilst there has been little research on whether providing a range of family-friendly 
policies raises workplace performance, there is some evidence to link individual practices 
with enhanced productivity.  For example, Skinner found that employees had greater 
enthusiasm for their work where they were employed on a part-time basis, which might then 
be expected to generate higher productivity (Skinner, 1999:  430).  Certainly, some part-time 
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workers believe that they are more productive than when they were previously working full-
time (Lewis, 1997:  16-17; Lewis and Taylor, 1996:  117).  The fact that part-time employees 
may not require a paid break can also reduce costs for the employer (IRS, 2001b:  9).  Duffy 
and Pupo cite evidence that part-time workers experience lower levels of stress than full-time 
employees, and have lower absenteeism rates (Duffy and Pupo, 1992:  154, 169).  Employers 
of part-time workers are also able to call on the skills of a larger number of employees, and 
retain experienced staff who wish to reduce their hours and might otherwise seek alternative 
employment (Duffy and Pupo 1992:  155).  Given that the average cost of labour turnover has 
been estimated at £3,546 per employee (October 2000), the savings made by retaining 
employees could be significant (Institute of Personnel and Development, 2000:  8).   
The likely benefits of access to a wide range of other family-friendly policies shall be 
examined later, but the example of part-time working given above clearly illustrates the fact 
that there is already evidence that some family-friendly policies have benefits for employers.  
However, it might be expected that family-friendly policies would have different outcomes in 
workplaces with different characteristics.  It may also be the case that some family-friendly 
policies are superior to others in terms of the benefits they produce for women.  For example, 
in the short-term, switching from full- time to part-time employment may enable employees 
with families to meet their childcare commitments.  However, it has been widely noted that at 
least some employees believe that taking up family-friendly policies may have a negative 
impact on their career (Lewis, 1997:  14).  This finding is also supported by research by 
Skinner in her study of a public sector agency, where respondents felt that it was necessary to 
spend visible time in the job in order to win promotion (Skinner, 1999:  431-432).  Certainly, 
in the case of reduced-hours working, Lewis found that managers made a strong link between 
commitment and time spent in the workplace (Lewis, 1997:  16).  Given that long hours were 
valued by managers and thought to indicate commitment, it might be expected that part-time 
workers would be disadvantaged when seeking promotion.  Certainly they would accumulate 
less experience than their full-time colleagues (Duffy and Pupo, 1992:  85).  There is also 
evidence that part-time workers miss out on training which may take place away from the 
workplace and at a time when the part-time employee would not normally be working, which 
again, could reduce suitability for promotion (Skinner, 1999:  433; Duffy and Pupo, 1992:  
174).  Finally, Skinner finds that part-time employees can miss meetings held outside their 
working hours, so that either managers have to set aside extra time to make part-time workers 
aware of these communications, or they are not given the information at all (Skinner, 1999:  
432-433).  The negative effect of these factors on promotion prospects for part-time workers 
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could also have an adverse impact on morale, particularly where employees feel that hour-
for-hour they are more productive than their full- time colleagues, a view which male, full-
time managers seem to corroborate (Lewis, 1997:  17).   
It is perhaps the case that an employee who decides to work part-time may benefit 
from an increased ability to balance their work and home life that, for them personally, 
outweighs any disadvantages in terms of their career prospects.  Indeed Levanoni and Sales 
suggest that part-time workers may regard convenient hours as a priority to such an extent 
that they are willing to accept a reduced likelihood of promotion (Levanoni and Sales, 1990:  
12).  Skinner also found that employees would accept some disadvantages in order to work 
part-time (Skinner, 1999:  436).  However, it is also important to consider the likely effect of 
different types of family-friendly working on the employer.  Continuing with the example of 
part-time working, if this leads to reduced promotion prospects, this could result in the 
employee feeling undervalued and perhaps performing less well for their employer.  Having 
less training than full- time workers could also make part-time workers comparatively less 
productive, and management time spent giving part-time workers information they have 
missed through being unable to attend staff meetings could be costly, as could a failure to 
convey such information at all.  In contrast, family-friendly policies which allow employees 
to balance their work and family- lives whilst maintaining a full-time presence in the 
workplace may enable them to compete for promotion with colleagues without family 
responsibilities on a more equal basis.  This could allow the employer to maximize the 
potential of all workers, and the greater job-satisfaction which could result for employees 
might also have a positive effect on their productivity.  Therefore there may be a hierarchy of 
family-friendly policies in that those which do most to advance the long-term career interests 
of employees might also lead to higher levels of performance for the employer. 
  The focus of this paper is whether workplaces which offer particular family-friendly 
benefits experience enhanced performance.  The 1998 Workplace Employee Relations 
Survey (WERS98) (Department of Trade and Industry, 1999) provides information on the 
availability of various policies for non-managerial employees, namely switching from full-  to 
part-time employment, job-sharing, homeworking, term-time-only contracts, flexitime, 4½-
day weeks, paid time-off at short notice, parental leave, paternity leave and whether there is a 
workplace nursery or financial help with childcare.  The Management Questionnaire gives 
data on financial performance, labour productivity, the quality of the product or service, the 
rates of voluntary resignations and absenteeism, whether labour costs as a proportion of total 
costs have risen or fallen over the previous five years, whether labour productivity has 
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changed over the same period, and whether employees work harder than five years 
previously.  There are also a number of outcome measures in the Survey of Employees 
Questionnaire.  These variables will be discussed in greater detail in the data section and a 
full listing is given in the Appendix. 
The following section will outline the business case for equal opportunities and the 
various criticisms it has faced.  The business case arguments for equal opportunities shall 
then be applied to the various family-friendly policies under examination so that the expected 
costs and benefits of these policies can be explored.  The data section gives information on 
the dataset and variables, and explains the methods used to evaluate the link between family-
friendly policies and performance.  In the results section findings from the regression analysis 
and benchmarking are presented and the possible explanations for such results are 
considered.  Finally, the conclusion evaluates the extent to which this research manages to 
address the issue of whether there is indeed a business case for offering family-friendly 
policies, and the form that future research should ideally take. 
 
 
2.  Theory 
 
There is already a body of existing literature which explores the range of factors likely to 
affect performance at the workplace level (Fernie and Metcalf, 1995; Machin and Stewart, 
1996; McNabb and Whitfield, 1998) but apart from a single article by Perotin and Robinson 
(2000), there has been little quantitative work on the relationship between performance and 
equal opportunities policies, and none on the relationship with family-friendly policies.  
However, the likely effects of using equal opportunities policies within a workplace have 
been considered in the theoretical literature on the business case for equal opportunities, and 
similar arguments can be applied to family-friendly working practices.  Where writers have 
attempted to use research to investigate the costs and benefits of equal opportunities and 
family-friendly policies, this has been based on case study work rather than quantitative data 
(Bevan et al, 1999).  Whilst there is clearly a difference in my approach, which assesses the 
overall performance of establishments with particular family-friendly policies, rather than 
weighing up costs and benefits, the business case literature and previous case studies are 
useful in making inferences about the likely effects of the policies under examination. 
The business case for equal opportunities suggests that firms adopting equal 
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opportunities and family-friendly working practices can benefit directly from the policies 
they implement, as they then maximize the potential of all employees (Cassell 1996:  55).  
Therefore it follows that equal opportunities is of interest to employers other than those who 
wish to make a commitment to the welfare of their employees on moral grounds, and that 
providing equality of opportunity in the workplace should not be regarded as a burden on 
business (Dickens, 1994a:  5).  In addition, the business case may encourage employers to 
commit to the achievement of equal opportunities outcomes, as the link is made between 
benefits for the firm and actual equality of opportunity, rather than with policies which may 
not be fully implemented (Dickens, 1994a:  8).  
The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) identifies a number of specific areas in 
which equal opportunities and family-friendly policies might be expected to benefit an 
employer.  Firstly, they claim that such policies increase the labour pool, making it easier to 
fill vacancies and ensuring that the best possible selection and promotion decisions are made.  
In addition, demographic changes and high employment levels raise the costs to employers of 
excluding a section of the workforce (Dickens, 1994b:  262; Cassell, 1996:  55).  The CBI 
also states that absenteeism and turnover rates are likely to be lower where employers 
recognise the needs of employees to balance their working life with their family 
responsibilities.  This is because, where the conflict between work and family- life is reduced, 
employees may need to take less time-off work to deal with family problems.  We might also 
expect that employees with families are unlikely to be attracted to work for employers who 
offer fewer such advantages (Dickens, 1994a:  10).  Flexible working is thought to benefit the 
workplace not only by enabling the retention of employees with family-responsibilities, but 
also by allowing the firm to respond quickly to customer demand and ensuring more efficient 
use of capital.  Clearly a firm offering equality of opportunity would avoid the costs of 
discrimination claims, both in terms of direct costs and the cost of damage to customer 
perceptions, but may also gain positive benefits from creating the image of treating 
employees fairly (Dickens, 1994b:  263, 265).  In particular, if there is greater diversity in the 
characteristics of employees, the firm may develop a broader understanding of the needs of 
customers and investors (Dickens, 1994b:  264; CBI, 1996:  15-21).  The Equal Opportunities 
Commission (EOC) has also argued that equal opportunities may result in improved 
employee relations if workers feel that they are treated fairly (Dickens, 1994b:  263). 
A number of writers have questioned whether these business arguments have the 
power to produce equality of opportunity in practice.  It is argued that the benefits of a 
particular policy vary from workplace to workplace, so adopting equal opportunities and 
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family-friendly policies may be worthwhile for some establishments, but not for others 
(Dickens, 1994a:  11).  For example, the costs of certain family-friendly policies, such as a 
workplace nursery may be prohibitively expensive for a workplace with few employees.  In 
addition, it may be apparent to an employer with a large number of female employees that 
they can benefit from providing equal opportunities and family-friendly working, but where 
employees are mainly male, the benefits would perhaps be reduced (Dickens, 1994a:  12).  
The strategy of the employer could have an important effect on whether adopting equal 
opportunities is beneficial, as where the emphasis is on low-cost production, the costs of such 
policies may mean that they are not considered worthwhile (Liff and Cameron, 1997:  41).   
However, the arguments for and against particular policies do not just depend on 
workplace characteristics.  If the benefits of offering family-friendly and equal opportunities 
policies in recruitment are greater when unemployment is low, it follows that the business 
case arguments are weaker when unemployment is high.  As employers operate in different 
labour markets there is reason to suspect that some employers will experience fewer benefits 
and have fewer incentives to offer such policies than others (Dickens, 1994a:  12).  There is 
the added problem that firms may only consider short-term costs and benefits, whereas the 
actual benefits of equal opportunities and family-friendly working are likely to accrue over 
the long-term and may not be directly financially measurable (Dickens, 1994b:  271). 
Encouraging employers to adopt equality of opportunity for the business benefits 
alone may not persuade them to do enough, as they may only adopt policies which are of 
clear benefit to them, rather than considering the interests of employees.  For example, 
Biswas and Cassell give the example of a hotel where managers felt there was a business case 
for having attractive female receptionists in order to appeal to customers (Biswas and Cassell, 
1996).  Finally, if an employer adopts equal opportunities and family-friendly initiatives with 
the aim of achieving business benefits, the commitment may not exist amongst staff and 
managers for the policies to succeed, which could result in the firm not experiencing the 
predicted benefits (Dickens, 1994b:  279-280, 282).  For example, top management may 
introduce family-friendly policies, but if employees feel that their career will suffer if they 
utilize the policies on offer, the benefits of having such policies will not be felt (Lewis, 1997:  
14; IRS 2001a:  5).  If employees without families believe that others are receiving special 
treatment, they may become less motivated, which raises the cost of offering family-friendly 
policies.  This problem led Liff and Cameron to argue that it is necessary to change the 
culture of the organization, and perhaps train all employees to understand the needs of others, 
alongside introducing policies.  Clearly this imposes furthe r costs, and implies that the 
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business case is not strong enough to secure equal opportunities and family-friendly working 
on its own (Liff and Cameron, 1997:  44).   
However, as I mentioned earlier, whilst there are some strong arguments against the 
business case, there has been little research to affirm whether the suspicions are true.  Bevan 
et al (1999) have conducted case study work, but it is not easy to translate knowledge about 
individual workplaces facing very specific product and labour market conditions to the 
economy as a whole.  An alternative approach is to consider whether companies with a higher 
number of family-friendly policies have better performance on average than those with fewer 
such policies.  Whilst this fails to take account of the costs of particular policies, by using a 
range of performance measures, it is possible to consider these costs to some extent.  For 
example, a measure of financial performance should reflect the costs of offering, or failing to 
offer family-friendly policies.  My intention is to consider the relative performance of 
establishments with and without particular family-friendly policies whilst controlling for 
other factors likely to affect performance. 
In the context of the business case, the assumption is that the family-friendly policies 
under examination would be expected to produce performance benefits as they allow those 
with childcare responsibilities greater freedom to balance their work and family lives.  
Certainly all policies could have benefits in terms of increased retention, both because such 
family-friendly policies may not be offered by other employers, and because employees may 
feel greater loyalty to their employer where they are facilitated in managing their family 
lives.  By offering family-friendly policies, the employer can promote a caring image, which 
could increase the number of applicants for jobs.  The types of working on offer may also 
open up the job to new applicants.  For example, homeworking may allow the employment of 
disabled workers or others who would be unable to attend the workplace due to childcare 
responsibilities, or their distance from the place of employment (Baruch, 2000:  36; Riley and 
Weaver McCloskey, 1997:  139).   
However, it is important to consider the likely costs and benefits to employers of 
offering each family-friendly policy individually because, as was mentioned in the 
introduction, it would be expected that these costs and benefits would vary from policy to 
policy.  Employing part-time workers or job-sharers may enable the firm to draw on a wide 
range of talent at a much lower cost than employing the equivalent number of full-time 
workers.  In contrast, providing a workplace nursery, financial help with childcare, flexitime 
or 4½-day weeks could allow employees to manage their work and family lives whilst 
accumulating experience comparable to that of employees without family responsibilities.  In 
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addition, they may also be more able than part-time workers to attend training and staff 
meetings, thus ensuring that they develop their careers to the full and maximize their 
productivity for the employer.   
There is already some evidence that where certain family-friendly policies are on 
offer, the productivity of employees may be enhanced.  A study of 120 employees working at 
home for one day a week in a Fortune 500 company in the United States, found that 97 per 
cent of participants and their supervisors reported that productivity was raised by teleworking 
(Riley and Weaver McCloskey, 1997:  135-136).  There is also evidence that part-time work 
for executives can yield performance benefits, as an Industrial Society report on job-sharing 
found that of a sample of 69 pairs of jobsharers, less than one in ten managers were thought 
to perform at the same level or worse than their full- time counterparts (IRS, 2001a:  5).   
Employees with access to a workplace nursery would not experience the problem of 
arranging childcare, which could enhance their productivity as they would not need to spend 
time making childcare arrangements if their usual carer were unavailable.  Access to 
flexitime and 4½-day weeks could also increase productivity if workers were able to arrange 
their time in order to meet childcare commitments.  Productivity benefits could be 
experienced from offering financial help with childcare, as the value attached to this 
entitlement by employees might induce them to raise their work effort in order to increase the 
probability of long-term employment in the workplace.  The reduced levels of stress for those 
able to take generous entitlements to paternity and parental leave could also result in 
productivity benefits if employees return to work under less pressure at home and feeling that 
they have received good treatment from their employer.   
There may be benefits for the employer in terms of reduced absenteeism amongst 
employees taking up family-friendly entitlements.  Dalton and Mesch found that teleworking 
reduces absenteeism (Dalton and Mesch, 1990).  It might also be expected that absenteeism 
would be relatively low amongst term-time-only workers, as they would not have the 
problem of arranging childcare during school holidays, a difficult issue for working parents 
(Hilpern, 2000:  2).  Similarly, employees with access to a workplace nursery would be 
expected to have lower absenteeism rates, and where flexitime was available, employees may 
decide to take flexi- leave to meet unforeseen childcare problems.  The advantage of offering 
paid time-off at short-notice is that this may give employees the incentive to inform the 
employer of their absence, therefore making it easier for the employer to arrange cover than if 
the absence was unpaid, and as a result went unreported.  Paternity or parental leave could 
also reduce absenteeism resulting from pressures within the family.  However, there may not 
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be a link between the employer offering financial help with childcare and a lower 
absenteeism rate due to the fact that the employee would still have the problem of arranging 
alternative childcare if their regular source of provision were not available. 
There is also a likely advantage to employers in offering family-friendly working in 
that employees may accept lower pay in order to have access to family-friendly policies.  As 
was suggested earlier, this may well be the case with regard to part-time working.  In 
addition, homeworking would seem to offer some cost savings in terms of office space where 
employees work from home on a permanent basis (Riley and Weaver McCloskey, 1997:  
137).  In the case of flexitime, access to this scheme could reduce the need for the employer 
to pay overtime, which could result in a significant saving.   
However, there are also potential disadvantages to the family-friendly policies under 
examination.  Many of the policies are likely to impose some costs on the workplace.  For 
example, employees may need access to office equipment and technical support if they are to 
work from home (Felstead and Jewson, 1999:  36).  Manager also have to sacrifice the ability 
to monitor the number of hours worked by homeworkers, although there is evidence that they 
actually have a tendency to overwork, which leads to the opposite problem of stress and job 
dissatisfaction (Riley and Weaver McCloskey, 1997:  139; Baruch, 2000:  40).  In the case of 
job-sharing, costs may be incurred during the handover between the job-sharers, as time must 
be taken to exchange information, and information may not be fully conveyed.  There are 
obvious costs attached to offering paid time-off at short-notice, and paternity and parental 
leave could be expensive, both if they are paid, and if it is necessary to employ temporary 
staff, or pay overtime.  There could also be a cost attached to these policies in terms of the 
morale of other employees if they are expected to take on the work of absent colleagues, or if 
inefficiency and failure to meet targets loses business for the employer.  Family-friendly 
services, and flexibility provided by the employer also have direct costs, such as the cost of 
staffing a workplace nursery, the start-up and monitoring costs of flexitime, and the cost of 
financial help with childcare. 
There are further costs in terms of the morale of employees excluded from family-
friendly policies.  In the case of parental or paternity leave, paid time-off at short-notice, 
financial help with childcare, or a workplace nursery, employees without children could feel 
that those with families receive special treatment, although flexitime might be equally useful 
to all employees (Cooper, 2000:  36).  If some employees with children are excluded from 
certain entitlements, either because of their employment status or occupation, or in the case of 
a workplace nursery, because not enough places are available, this could cause resentment 
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and damage productivity.  An additional problem with a workplace nursery is that it would 
only help employees with pre-school-age children, at least during term-time, whereas 
financial help with childcare could also provide for school-age children outside school hours, 
and would not suffer from the capacity limitations of a workplace nursery. 
As with part-time working, family-friendly policies which reduce the amount of 
visible time the employee spends in the workplace could reduce promotion prospects and 
hence productivity for the employer.  This problem may occur not just with part-time 
working and job-sharing, but also with term-time-only contracts and homeworking, where 
employees spend less time in the workplace.  Certainly employees in the Riley and Weaver 
McCloskey study felt that their promotion prospects would suffer as a result of working at 
home, although this problem may be reduced if employees attended the office a few times a 
week (Riley and Weaver McClosky, 1997:  139).  If these workers are perceived as less 
committed to their work because of their lower face-time in the workplace, they may feel 
undervalued and their productivity could be further reduced.  Baruch point out that one of the 
problems with working from home is that employees are not involved in social interaction, 
and if they feel isolated, this could damage morale, and ultimately productivity (Baruch, 
2000:  45; Felstead and Jewson, 1999:  35; IRS, 2001c:  5).  
The accumulation of experience and training may also be lower for those on reduced-
hours working, although the effect of this would probably be minimized in the case of 4½-
day weeks, where the employee would not work significantly fewer hours than a full-time 
employee.  However, even for full-time employees it could be difficult to attend training 
away from the workplace or outside the individual's normal working hours, regardless of the 
family-friendly provisions available in the workplace.  Flexitime and 4½-day weeks may 
present problems if commitment is measured in terms of visible time spent in the workplace, 
given that whilst these schemes allow employees to work on a full- time, or almost full-time 
basis, those with families may choose to work different hours to their colleagues.  However, 
the problem of long hours being used as an indicator of commitment might be reduced where 
there is flexitime if it encourages the philosophy that employees working extra hours when 
needed are entitled to an equivalent number of hours in lieu.   
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3.  Data 
 
WERS98 contains data on 2191 workplaces with 10 or more employees, and consists of 
management, employee and workplace representative surveys.  For the purposes of this 
analysis the focus is on the Management and Survey of Employees Questionnaires.  28,240 
employees completed the Employee Questionnaire.  By using the weights contained in the 
dataset, the WERS98 sample can be made representative of the population of UK 
workplaces1.  The survey also contains information on a wide range of workplace 
characteristics (Cully et al, 1999:  5).  This means that controls can be introduced to assess 
whether having particular family-friendly policies is linked with enhanced performance on 
average, across the full range of workplace sizes, industries and other characteristics.  
However, one proviso is that this paper focuses on the private sector.  Table 1 shows that 
there is a big difference between the public and private sectors in terms of the availability of 
family-friendly policies, with the incidence of all the policies under examination being much 
higher in the public sector.  
In addition, the ratio of the incidence of individual policies in the public and private 
sectors demonstrates that there is no uniform difference in the pattern of incidence.  For 
example, having a workplace nursery is almost six times as common in the public sector as in 
the private sector, whilst paid time-off for childcare is only one-and-a-half times more 
common in the public sector.  As the two sectors seem to differ so much in the pattern of 
incidence, it was decided to concentrate on the private sector, due to the fact that in the 
economy as a whole many more people work in the private, rather than the public, sector. 
 The Management Questionnaire does contain some direct questions about the costs 
and benefits experienced by the employer as a result of employees taking up their 
entitlements to family-friendly policies2.  Of the 62.4 per cent of employers who offered at 
least one family-friendly entitlement, managers in almost two-thirds of workplaces reported 
some take up of the policies on offer.  Of these, in 72.0 per cent of establishments it was 
reported that these entitlements had meant no, or only minimal additional costs, with only 2.3 
per cent having experienced substantial additional costs.  In 84.6 per cent of workplaces the 
entitlements were thought cost-effective.  Only 9.7 per cent of workplaces had experienced 
                                                 
1 The exceptions are the following Standard Industrial Classifications:  Agriculture, hunting and forestry; 
Fishing; Mining and quarrying; Private households with employed persons; and Extra-territorial organisations. 
2 The list of family-friendly policies covered by this question are parental leave, working at or from home in 
normal working hours, term-time only contracts, switching from full- to part-time employment, job-sharing, a 
workplace nursery or nursery linked with workplace, or financial help/subsidy to parents for childcare. 
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no benefits from offering the family-friendly policies, whilst 53.0 per cent found staff happier 
as a result.  In over a third of workplaces, the family-friendly policies made it easier to retain 
staff, and in 23.4 per cent of establishments it was thought that workplace performance had 
improved as a result of the policies.  However, family-friendly entitlements were only 
considered an effective way of recruiting staff in 4.5 per cent of workplaces. 
 
3.1  The dependent variables 
 
Clearly, the issue of how performance is measured is a controversial one.  Rather than ask for 
information on absolute levels of performance, such as profits, the WERS98 Management 
Questionnaire asks managers to rate the financial performance, labour productivity and 
quality of their product or service relative to the average.  They are also asked whether labour 
productivity, and labour costs relative to other costs, have gone up or down compared with 
five years previously.  In addition, managers report whether there has been a change in how 
hard employees work relative to five years ago.  All these responses are measured on a five-
point scale.  The Management Questionnaire also contains data on the number of voluntary 
resignations over the previous year and the proportion of working days lost through sickness 
or unauthorised absence over the previous twelve months.   
The financial performance data has been used by a number of writers (Addison and 
Belfield, 2000; Machin and Stewart, 1996; McNabb and Whitfield, 1998; McNabb and 
Whitfield, 2000).  In addition, Perotin and Robinson (2000) considered the data on labour 
productivity, and Fernie and Metcalf (1995) used a number of performance indicators from 
the 1990 WIRS.  In this paper it was decided to use a range of performance measures to 
capture the relationship between family-friendly policies and various aspects of workplace 
performance.  Table 3 shows the degree of correlation between each of the performance 
measures and suggests that there are sufficient differences between the measures to justify the 
approach of examining each performance measure separately.  
Table 2 shows the distribution of responses for the eight dependent variables from the 
Management Questionnaire.  Clearly there is a tendency for managers to rate the performance 
of their workplace as above-average, but this data is still useful.  Machin and Stewart find 
evidence to support the view that managers do assess performance reasonably accurately, as 
workplaces where lower levels of performance were reported in the 1984 WIRS were more 
likely than others to have closed down by 1990 (Machin and Stewart, 1996:  219-220).  A 
subjective assessment of performance is easier to interpret than workplace accounts, and 
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Pencavel makes the point that as most workers are employed in the service sector, it is 
extremely difficult to find an objective measure of labour productivity that can be 
consistently applied across sectors (Pencavel, 2000:  45).  However, as management 
responses are not evenly distributed between the five categories, it was decided to focus on 
whether the response was above-average, or average or below, thus reducing each five-point 
scale to just two categories, mirroring McNabb and Whitfield’s approach to the financial 
performance data (McNabb and Whitfield, 1998).  It was then possible to run probit 
regressions on the categorical dependent variables, and logistic weighted least squares 
regressions on the rate of voluntary resignations and absenteeism data.   
The Survey of Employees was used to look at additional questions on the feelings of 
employees about their job and employer.  It was decided to use the whole sample rather than 
just the responses of employees with children to reflect the possibility that those without 
children, or excluded from access to the policies, might resent others receiving special 
benefits.  By considering all responses, it was possible to consider the relationship between 
the availability of family-friendly policies and the views of the whole workforce.   
Employees were asked to rate, on a five point-scale, their level of satisfaction with the 
amount of pay they received.  This question was used because it was thought that employees 
might be happier with their monetary rewards where the non-monetary benefits of family-
friendly working were available.  Employees also stated the extent to which they shared the 
values of their employer, whether they felt that managers were understanding of their family 
responsibilities, and whether they felt loyal to, or proud to tell people that they worked for, 
their employer.  These variables were used as indirect performance measures, based on the 
expectation that if employees felt that they were treated well, they would be more productive.  
The responses, again on a five-point scale, were reduced to either agreement with the 
statements, or satisfaction with particular aspects of the job, in the same way as the 
Management Questionnaire data, as again the responses were not evenly distributed.  Table 4 
shows the distribution of responses.  Probit regressions were run on the collapsed scales.   
 
3.2  The independent variables 
 
The Management Questionnaire provides information on the types of family-friendly policies 
available within a workplace (see Appendix for a detailed description of the variables).  
However, it is not apparent whether all non-managerial employees are able to take up the 
policies on offer.  One option is to use the data on the availability of family-friendly practices 
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from the Survey of Employees instead.  However, there are two main problems with this.  
Firstly, the Survey of Employees contains data on a smaller range of family-friendly policies 
than those we have information on from the Management Questionnaire (only flexitime, job-
sharing, parental leave, working from home, a workplace nursery or financial help with 
childcare, grouped as one category, and whether they can take paid time-off at short notice; 
but not term-time only contracts, switching from full- to part-time working, 4½-day weeks, or 
parental leave).  The second problem with using the Survey of Employees is the difference in 
the reporting of the availability of family-friendly policies between the Employee and 
Management Questionnaires.  The Survey of Employees data suggests less widespread 
availability of family-friendly practices than that reported by managers.  Whilst this could 
suggest that family-friendly policies are not available to employees in practice, an alternative 
option is that perhaps employees who do not have responsibility for childcare are not aware 
of the policies on offer in their workplace.  Indeed, Cully et al suggest that this may be the 
case (Cully et al, 1999:  145).  Whilst the management respondent might exaggerate the 
number of family-friendly policies offered to make the employer seem more progressive, 
they should also be in a better position to know exactly which family-friendly policies are 
available.  For this reason, data from the Management Questionnaire is used.   
There is also scope for the value of the policies to employees to vary depending on the 
restrictions which employers place on individual policies.  For example, there may be a 
requirement to work “core hours” where flexitime is available, and this could limit the ability 
of employees to use flexitime to meet childcare commitments.  The generosity of financial 
help with childcare could also vary from workplace to workplace.  However, despite the lack 
of detailed information on the family-friendly measures, it seems reasonable to assume that 
where such policies are offered employees are likely to be better able to balance their work 
and family lives than those in workplaces without family-friendly initiatives. 
 
3.3  The control variables 
 
Many factors affect workplace performance, and it is necessary to control for these influences 
in order to observe the relationship between family-friendly policies and performance.  Table 
5 demonstrates that workplaces with four or more equal opportunities policies (from a list of 
six) are more likely to have any of the family-friendly policies than those with one or no 
equal opportunities policies.  As the business case literature argues that having equal 
opportunities policies affects performance, it is necessary to control for the existence of these 
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policies in order to observe the effects of the family-friendly practices (see Appendix for a 
full description of all the variables).  Machin and Stewart (1996) demonstrate the effect that 
trade unions can have on financial performance using WIRS3, and Fernie and Metcalf (1995) 
show that both the presence of a union and employee involvement practices have an affect on 
a range of performance measures.  For the purposes of this paper I focus on whether or not a 
union is recognised for the purposes of negotiating pay and conditions in the workplace, and 
consider the relationship between human resource management (HRM) practices and 
performance, rather than employee involvement alone.  The HRM measures used are whether 
most employees in the largest occupational group were trained in a job other than their own, 
whether there was performance pay, and whether strategic HRM, or HRM recruitment, or 
communication methods were used (see Appendix).  These practices are not unique to HRM 
workplaces, but we would expect them to be more widespread in HRM workplaces. 
The performance of the workplace might also be expected to depend on whether a 
collective dispute had taken place over the previous year and whether it was situated in a 
growing market.  As the WERS98 Management Questionnaire only asks about the state of 
the product market for workplaces in the trading sector, the results in this paper only reflect 
the findings for this part of the economy.  A control for workplaces where more than half of 
all employees were in the managerial, professional or technical categories was introduced, on 
the grounds that as these workers would probably have already demonstrated a high level of 
commitment in order to have achieved their position, qualifications or training, they might be 
more strongly motivated towards work than other employees, causing them to be more 
productive.  Whether the workplace had attained ISO9000 was used to control for the quality 
of processes within the workplace.  In addition, it was thought that employees who 
experienced greater variety in their work might perform better because of greater interest in 
their job, resulting in a lower quit rate and lower replacement costs for the establishment.   
It might be expected that employees whose most recent pay rise was less than the 
average for similar workers in the locality would be less productive than those with an above-
average pay increase, and so there is a control for the size of the most recent pay rise.  It is 
necessary to control for the proportion of the workforce that is female, because as Gershuny 
demonstrates, women still take greater responsibility for the home than men, so it would be 
expected that employers are more likely to experience performance effects from providing 
family-friendly working where a greater proportion of the workforce is female (Gershuny, 
1997:  148).  The performance of the workplace could also vary according to its size, as 
economies of scale might be experienced.  Finally, it would be expected that performance 
16 
would vary between industrial sectors.  For example, there may be much greater potential to 
raise labour productivity in a capital- intensive industry than one that is labour-intensive.  By 
controlling for each of the factors outlined above, we reduce the likelihood that the 
relationship observed between the availability of family-friendly policies and performance is 
due to a separate factor, say that perhaps larger establishments might be more likely to have 
above-average performance, and are also more likely to offer family-friendly policies. 
 
3.4  Other data considerations  
 
The fact that the WERS data is cross-sectional means that we do not know when the family-
friendly policies were introduced, and whether performance has changed in response to the 
policies.  It is possible that workplaces with better performance are more likely to introduce 
family-friendly policies as they can afford to do so, meaning that better performance leads to 
the introduction of family-friendly policies rather than vice versa.  However, there are a 
number of factors to bear in mind in response to this problem.  Firstly, the assumption that a 
workplace with above-average performance is more likely to introduce new policies than one 
which is performing less well could be flawed.  Whilst an employer with better performance 
is better able to afford new policies, they also have less incentive to do so.  The additional 
resources could be invested in capital or training to produce more easily-quantifiable benefits.   
The suggestion that there might be reverse causation is less convincing in relation to 
the data on the satisfaction of employees with the employer.  Employers might choose to 
reward more loyal, dedicated employees with family-friendly policies, but given that family-
friendly policies might also have negative effects, such as creating dissatisfaction amongst 
employees unable to benefit from the policies, there are other ways of rewarding employees 
which might be much more attractive to the employer.  For example, the employer could 
reward employees for loyalty through higher pay, or the provision of benefits which can be 
used by all staff, rather than just those with families.   
Even if family-friendly policies were found to be associated with better performance 
because having good performance facilitates the introduction of family-friendly initiatives, it 
could still be argued that if family-friendly policies were detrimental to the interests of 
employers, over time the performance of workplaces with such policies would deteriorate.  
Therefore evidence that family-friendly policies are linked to above-average performance 
would argue against a significant disadvantage for firms offering family-friendly working. 
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4.  Results and Discussion 
 
4.1  Marginal effects for the Management Questionnaire  
 
Table 6 reports the marginal effects of each of the independent variables - that is the 
proportional increase or decrease in the dependent variable due to a particular policy or 
workplace characteristic.  The interpretation of the marginal effects reported in Table 6 is that 
the probability that financial performance is above-average in a workplace which offers 
paternity leave is 93 per cent higher than that for a workplace without such a policy.  All of 
the family-friendly policies, apart from term-time-only contracts, have a significant 
relationship with at least one of the performance measures.  Managers are more likely to 
report that labour costs as a proportion of total costs have fallen compared with five years 
previously where homeworking is offered.  The fact that the rate of voluntary resignations 
has a negative relationship with homeworking perhaps gives an explanation for this, as it is 
likely that if the quit rate is lower where some employees are allowed to work from home, 
this would reduce the costs associated with hiring and perhaps training, new employees.   
Switching from full- to part-time employment is positively associated with there 
having been an increase in labour productivity over the previous five years, but also with a 43 
per cent reduction in the likelihood that financial performance is above-average.  This 
suggests that whilst productivity has risen in workplaces with this policy on offer, overall, 
financial performance is more likely to be below average.  This negative relationship 
provides some support for the argument that whilst part-time employees may have greater 
enthusiasm for their work than they had as full- time workers, over the longer-term the fact 
that they accumulate less experience and have reduced access to training may have 
implications for the financial performance of the workplace.  Job-sharing also has a 
significant negative relationship with labour productivity being above-average.  If employees 
working reduced hours are less likely to receive training and are less likely to be promoted, 
and as a result suffer demotivation, it is apparent why this might be the case.  There may also 
be some loss of productivity in the handover between job-sharing partners. 
There is no obvious explanation as to why labour productivity is 78 per cent less 
likely to be above-average in a workplace with nursery facilities.  However, it is important to 
note that both the rate of voluntary resignations and the absenteeism rate are lower where 
employees have access to a workplace nursery, and this could produce significant savings for 
the employer, outweighing the costs of lower labour productivity.  Offering financial help 
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with childcare seems to result in the clearest benefits to the employer, as it is associated with 
above-average financial performance, labour productivity, and quality, and there having been 
an increase in labour productivity over the previous five years.  The rate of voluntary 
resignations is also lower where the employer offers financial help with childcare.  This 
suggests that, as might be expected, financial help with childcare is likely to produce benefits 
in terms of retention and raised productivity whilst providing no evidence of significant costs.   
Flexitime and 4½-day weeks are both associated with an increase in labour 
productivity over the previous five years, and a lower rate of voluntary resignations.  Quality 
is more likely to be above-average where there is flexitime.  Managers are 61 per cent more 
likely to report that employees work harder now than five years ago where employees are 
able to work a 4½-day week, which is consistent with the idea that employees working 
shorter hours may be more productive during the time they do spend at work.  Offering paid 
time-off work at short-notice is associated with a lower absenteeism rate, which suggests that 
this type of leave reduces the costs of un-notified absences.   
There is mixed evidence on the relationship between performance and the use of 
equal opportunities policies, and between workplace governance and performance, but it 
seems that whilst union recognition is associated with a reduced likelihood that the quality of 
the product or service is above-average, there is evidence of above-average performance in 
unionised workplaces.  Labour productivity is 31 per cent more likely to have risen over the 
previous five years than in workplaces without union recognition, and relative labour costs 
are more likely to have fallen.  The quit rate is also 39 per cent lower than average in 
workplaces with union recognition.  Where the HRM variables are significant, strategic 
HRM, HRM recruitment methods and training in a second job are all associated with 
improved workplace performance.  However, the performance pay variable does not have a 
significant relationship with any of the performance measures, and HRM communication 
methods are associated with managers being less likely to report that employees work harder 
now than five years earlier, and with a higher absenteeism rate.  This suggests that overall 
there is no clear-cut relationship between HRM and improved performance.   
The quality of a product or service is less likely to be reported as above-average 
where there has been a collective dispute over the previous twelve months, and it is less 
likely that employees are reported as working harder now than five years earlier where there 
has been a dispute.  It does indeed seem that workplace performance is better where the 
employer conforms to ISO9000, as financial performance and quality are more likely to be 
above-average in these workplaces, although the probability that the workplace has 
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experienced an increase in labour productivity over the previous five years is reduced by six 
per cent.  Unsurprisingly, financial performance and labour productivity are more likely to be 
above-average where managers report that employees have a lot of variety in their work.  The 
findings on the performance of workplaces in a growing market are also unsurprising.  
Financial performance is more likely to be above-average where the market is growing, and 
labour productivity is more likely to have increased over the previous five years, with it also 
being reported that employees work harder in a growing market.   
There is evidence that having a more highly skilled workforce is associated with 
higher quality production, but there is no other significant evidence that workplaces with a 
more skilled workforce perform better.  It also seems that newer workplaces have higher quit 
and absenteeism rates.  The likelihood of a workplace having above-average financial 
performance is raised by 83 per cent where a greater proportion of the workforce is female, 
but there is little other evidence to link performance and gender.  The probability of financial 
performance and labour productivity being above-average are raised by over eighty per cent 
where the most recent pay increase was above the average for the locality, and the workplace 
is more likely to have increased it's productivity over the previous five years where there has 
been an above-average pay rise.  Finally, there is some evidence that larger workplaces have 
better performance than those in the 10-24 employees category.   
 
4.2  Marginal effects for the Survey of Employees Questionnaire  
 
Turning to Table 7, employees are more likely to be satisfied with the amount of pay they 
receive where there is parental leave, homeworking or a workplace nursery.  They are also 
more likely to feel loyal to an organisation where there is homeworking or flexitime, and are 
more likely to report that they share the values of the organisation and that managers are 
understanding of family responsibilities where flexitime is available.  Allowing employees to 
switch from full- to part-time employment is positively associated with managers being 
thought understanding of family responsibilities, and job-sharing is associated with 
employees sharing the values of the organisation; affirming that employees with families 
value these practices.  They are also more likely to say that they are proud to tell people who 
they work for where there is a workplace nursery, homeworking or paid time-off at short-
notice, and share the values of the organisation where there is a workplace nursery or paid 
time-off at short notice.  The implication is perhaps that employees are more likely to feel 
proud of, or loyal to, their employer where they are given some autonomy over the 
20 
organization of work through homeworking or flexitime, or where the employer offers actual 
family-friendly benefits, such as a workplace nursery or paid time-off at short-notice.   
Employees are less likely to say that they are proud to tell people who they work for 
where some are employed on term-time-only contracts, and they are also less likely to report 
that managers are understanding of their family responsibilities and that they share the values 
of the organisation.  This is surprising, because it might have been expected that this policy 
would have been designed specifically to help those with family responsibilities and so would 
have been taken as a demonstration of the understanding of the employer.  However, it may 
be that employers offering such contracts are less understanding of employees with families 
who do not take up term-time-only contracts, or that those on term-time contracts receive less 
understanding from managers when they experience problems with childcare during term-
time.  As term-time-only working is negatively associated with attitudes towards the 
employer, managers may need to consider carefully the policies offered and the way in which 
they are implemented to ensure that they have a positive effect on the feelings of employees. 
The marginal effects for the equal opportunities policies show a positive relationship 
between the employer reviewing selection procedures to identify discrimination and greater 
satisfaction with pay, increased loyalty and pride, and a greater likelihood that employees 
share the values of the organisation.  They are also more likely to feel proud of their 
employer where there are special procedures to encourage applications from women 
returners, but employees are less likely to share the values of the organisation where 
promotions are monitored by gender.   
Turning to workplace governance, the marginal effects suggest that union recognition 
is associated with a lower likelihood of employees feeling loyal to, or proud of, their 
employer and being less likely to share the values of the organisation.  Employees in 
workplaces where there is union recognition are also less likely to believe that managers are 
understanding of family responsibilities.  It could be that unionised workers are more likely 
than others to feel discontented with their employer as they join the union in response to their 
existing feelings of discontent, or that the union highlights the problems with the workplace 
for employees.  Fernie and Gray (2002) found that workplaces with union recognition were 
more likely to offer family-friendly policies than workplaces without a recognized union, so 
the higher levels of discontent cannot be explained by fewer family-friendly policies being on 
offer in unionised workplaces (Fernie and Gray, 2002).  It seems that HRM governance has 
little effect on the attitudes of employees to their employer, as only performance pay has a 
significant impact on any of the dependent variables, showing that managers are less likely to 
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be considered understanding of family responsibilities where there is performance pay.  This 
result suggests that there may be a trade-off between the use of performance pay and the 
extent to which managers acknowledge the responsibilities of employees outside work. 
Employees are more likely to say that they are proud to tell people who they work for 
where they have a lot of variety in their job, and conforming to ISO9000 is consistent with 
managers being more understanding of family responsibilities.  This confirms evidence from 
the Management Questionnaire that quality and family-friendly employment are positively 
associated.  The fact that women tend to report higher levels of job satisfaction than men is 
fairly well-established (Ward and Sloane, 2000:  273), but it is worth noting that whilst this 
relationship is quite clear in the evidence from the Survey of Employees, there is only weak 
evidence to link above-average performance with the employment of a greater proportion of 
female workers in the Management Questionnaire.  This suggests that higher levels of job 
satisfaction are not necessarily translated into above-average performance, although if the 
convenience of the work is traded-off against other disadvantages, such as fewer prospects 
for advancement and less training, female employees could be satisfied with their work whilst 
not being fully utilised by their employer.  The evidence that employees can be satisfied with 
their employment in the face of obvious disadvantage is highlighted by the fact that 
employees in workplaces where the most recent pay increase was less than the average for 
similar workers in the locality are more likely to report that they are satisfied with their pay 
than those given the average pay rise.  Finally, it seems that employees in larger workplaces 
are less likely to report that managers understand their family responsibilities than those 
workplaces with between 10 and 24 employees, perhaps suggesting that because policies are 
formalised in larger workplaces to ensure procedural justice, the lack of scope for managerial 
discretion means that managers appear less sympathetic towards those with families. 
  
4.3  Benchmarking 
 
It is clear from the marginal effects that some family-friendly policies are associated with a 
lower likelihood that a workplace has above-average performance, whilst others are 
associated with a greater chance of above-average performance.  Given that family-friendly 
policies are not all associated with better performance per se, the question is whether on 
average we can expect workplaces which offer the full range of family-friendly policies 
under investigation to perform better than those with no such policies.  It is possible to 
consider this by using the regression equations to calculate the probability of a workplace 
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having above-average performance on each of the measures, for different sets of workplace 
characteristics.  Firstly the probability of above-average performance for the average 
workplace is calculated, and this can then be compared against a workplace with all the 
family-friendly policies, and then workplaces with no such policies.  For example, Table 8 
shows that 59 per cent of workplaces with typical characteristics have above-average 
financial performance, compared to 97 per cent of workplaces with all the family-friendly 
policies and only 55 per cent of workplaces with no family-friendly policies.   
The results give a strong indication that workplaces which offer the full range of 
family-friendly policies perform better than those which do not offer any such policies, with 
the average workplace lying somewhere between the two extremes, although closer to the 
workplace with no family-friendly policies than that with the full range.  The exception is that 
44 per cent of workplaces which offer all the family-friendly policies have above-average 
labour productivity, compared with 43 per cent of workplaces without any such policies.   
Benchmark workplaces for the Survey of Employees dependent variables are shown 
in Table 9.  The results for satisfaction with pay, pride in the employer and sharing the values 
of the organisation follow a similar pattern to the majority of the Management Questionnaire 
variables, with the most family-friendly workplaces having better performance on all these 
measures, and the typical workplace performing only slightly better than those with no 
family-friendly policies at all.  The exception is the loyalty measure, where the typical 
workplace actually performs worse than either the family-friendly or non-family-friendly 
workplace, although employees are more likely to feel loyal to the employer where more 
family-friendly policies are offered.  However, it seems that employees are least likely to 
believe that managers are understanding of family responsibilities where a large number of 
family-friendly policies are on offer.  This is perhaps because, as was mentioned in respect to 
larger workplaces, where family-friendly policies are formalised, the ability of managers to 
accommodate the needs of individual employees in a more informal way may be reduced, 
making them seem less understanding in response to individual requests from employees.   
Given the evidence that workplaces with a wide range of family-friendly policies have 
better performance, it is necessary to consider why certain policies are negatively associated 
with particular performance measures.  One explanation offered earlier was that because 
some policies result in employees being marginalized and regarded as less committed, they 
can ultimately result in demotivation and mean that talent is lost to the firm through higher 
quit rates or a failure to maximize labour productivity.  This proposition can be tested by 
considering whether workplaces which offer family-friendly policies expected to be less 
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damaging to the careers of employees with families are more likely to experience superior 
performance than those using policies which reduce workplace visibility3. 
The policies thought least likely to have a negative impact on the careers of 
employees with families are access to a workplace nursery, financial help with childcare, 
flexitime and 4½-day weeks4.  The reasons for believing that these policies may be superior 
to homeworking, switching to part-time employment, job-sharing and term-time-only 
contracts were explained earlier, but the general hypothesis is that policies which allow 
employees to be seen to work full-time or almost full- time, whilst making it easier to meet 
caring commitments though flexible hours, or the employer taking some responsibility for 
childcare, do more to ensure that employees with families can compete on an equal basis with 
their colleagues than policies which reduce their visibility in the workplace.   
  As policies which do most to advance the careers of employees with family 
responsibilities could also do most to benefit the employer, I consider the relationship 
between the two sets of family-friendly policies and performance.  Table 10 suggests that 
policies which do more to allow employees with families to maintain their presence in the 
workplace are associated with better performance than those which result in reduced-
visibility, although the change in relative labour costs is an exception to this.   
Only 14 per cent of workplaces with the greater-visibility family-friendly policies are 
likely to have experienced a fall in relative labour costs, compared to 21 per cent of 
workplaces with the reduced-visibility policies.  This suggests that the greater-visibility 
policies impose higher labour costs on the firm.  However, financial performance and labour 
productivity in workplaces which offer a workplace nursery, financial help with childcare, 
flexitime and 4½-day weeks are double that for workplaces which only offer job-sharing, 
switching from full- to part-time employment, homeworking and term-time-only working.  
The quit rate is much lower where the greater-visibility policies are on offer, and the 
absenteeism rate is also relatively low.  This suggests that even if labour costs are more likely 
to rise relative to other costs where such policies are available, there are many other 
performance benefits for the workplace which could outweigh the increase in costs. 
  The benchmarking results from the Survey of Employees (Table 11) also show that 
employees are more likely to be satisfied with their pay and feel satisfaction with their 
                                                 
3 The means for a typical workplace were used for all variables other than the eight family-friendly policies of 
interest.  This made it possible to observe the different effects of the variables in the two different 
characterisations where all other workplace characteristics were held constant. 
4 For ease, these policies will be referred to throughout as “greater-visibility policies”, due to the fact that in 
comparison to home-working, term-time -only contracts, switching from full- to part-time employment and job-
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employer where the family-friendly policies available are less likely to have a detrimental 
impact on their career.  However, it seems that workers are less likely to believe that 
managers are understanding of family responsibilities where the greater-visibility policies are 
on offer.  This is surprising given that part-time workers in Skinner’s study complained that 
they were denied access to training and information, suggesting that employers offering part-
time work may not demonstrate understanding of family responsibilities when deciding 
where and when training and meetings should be held.  However, if employees work part-
time or on term-time-only contracts they can be easily identified as employees with families, 
and as a result, consideration may be taken of their responsibilities in this respect.  It may be 
less obvious to the employer that full-time workers have caring roles outside work, and where 
employees have access to a workplace nursery or financial help with childcare, there may be 
an expectation that they should be more flexible than part-time workers without access to 
such facilities.  If this were the case, it is possible to see how workplaces offering the greater-
visibility family-friendly policies might also find their managers less understanding of family 
responsibilities.  This is consistent with the satisfaction which employees with access to the 
greater-visibility policies express on the other measures, as they could be quite satisfied by 
the policies on offer, whilst still being unhappy with management behaviour. 
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
There is strong evidence to suggest that family-friendly policies are associated with superior, 
rather than inferior, performance when controlling for a wide range of workplace 
characteristics.  Within this general pattern there are very few exceptions.  These findings are 
born out not just by the benchmarking for workplaces with and without the full range of 
family-friendly policies, but also by the marginal effects of individual policies, where the vast 
majority of significant results show a positive relationship between the workplace offering a 
particular family-friendly policy and above-average performance.  However, it seems that 
there is a distinction between policies which reduce the visibility of employees with family 
responsibilities, and those which enable them to maintain a full-time, or almost full-time, 
presence in the workplace.  It seems that workplaces where the reduced-visibility policies are 
on offer experience lower levels of performance than workplaces where the greater-visibility 
                                                                                                                                                        
sharing, they allow employees to maintain greater visibility in the workplace. 
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family-friendly policies are available.  Added to this, it seems that financial performance and 
labour productivity are more likely to be above-average, and the quit rate lower, in 
workplaces where no family-friendly policies are available, compared to those which only 
offer the reduced-hours or reduced-visibility practices.   
The findings imply that there is a stronger business case for family-friendly policies 
which do not reduce the visibility of employees in the workplace than those based on shorter 
working hours, or employment away from the establishment.  These policies have the 
additional benefit that they may ultimately produce greater equity, due to the fact that they 
are less likely to have a detrimental impact on the careers of employees with families.  
Clearly, the reverse side of this argument is that it is harder to make a business case for the 
reduced-visibility policies.  However, the earlier discussion highlighted the fact that the 
disadvantages of reduced-visibility policies to the employer are in part due to the fact that 
these workers are treated as a peripheral part of the workforce, and excluded from meetings 
and training by virtue of their working arrangements.  Problems also arise because 
commitment to the employer is thought directly related to the amount of time spent in the 
workplace.  Hence, whilst WERS98 demonstrates that reduced-visibility policies are 
associated with inferior workplace performance, the evidence from other studies suggest that 
this is largely a result of the different treatment of employees who are not present in the 
workforce full-time.  In the case of homeworking, term-time-only contracts, switching from 
full- to part-time employment and job-sharing, it is apparent that it is not sufficient to offer 
these policies in isolation.  It is necessary to ensure that employees taking up these 
entitlements are not disadvantaged in comparison to their colleagues who maintain a full-time 
presence in the workplace.  Were employers able to guarantee that this were the case, perhaps 
we might observe better performance in workplaces offering the reduced-visibility practices.  
For example, greater emphasis could be placed on giving all workers access to training and 
the same information as their full-time colleagues, whatever their working arrangements.  In 
addition, a programme of cultural change could be used to positively re-evaluate the 
contribution of part-time workers.  With the growth in part-time work and homeworking, and 
the Government’s encouragement of flexible working (most recently in the Employment Bill, 
November 2001), it is apparent that employers cannot avoid the possibly negative effects of 
reduced-visibility employment by simply refusing to offer these working options (Felstead et 
al, 2000:  2).  Employers therefore need to prevent the use of such practices resulting in 
competitive disadvantage through a failure to implement subsidiary policies which ensure 
that the full benefits of family-friendly employment are felt. 
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Table 1 – Incidence of equal opportunities and family-friendly policies in the public and 
private sectors  
 
Proportion of workplaces 
with practice 
Ratio of 
public sector 
incidence to 
private sector 
incidence 
 Private sector 
Public 
sector  
Parental leave 25.7 61.1 2.4 
Working from home 9.9 20.9 2.1 
Term-time-only working 9.3 34.8 3.7 
Switching from full- to part-time employment 39.3 65.3 1.7 
Job-sharing 16.4 64.6 3.9 
Workplace nursery 1.5 8.8 5.9 
Financial help with childcare 3.0 6.6 2.2 
Paternity leave 22.6 66.7 3.0 
Paid time-off for childcare at short-notice 52.6 78.5 1.5 
Flexitime 13.0 32.4 2.5 
4½-day week 2.2 4.2 1.9 
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Table 2 – Correlations between the Management Questionnaire performance measures5 
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Financial 
performance 
0.52*** 0.25*** 0.14*** 0.27*** -0.08*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 
Labour 
productivity 
 0.25*** 0.18*** 0.35*** -0.01 0.13*** 0.06** 
Change in labour 
productivity 
  0.46*** 0.09*** -0.03 0.12*** 0.10*** 
Change in how 
hard employees 
work over 5 years 
   0.01 0.00 0.05** 0.07*** 
Quality of product 
or service 
    0.06** 0.06** 0.09*** 
Change in relative 
labour costs over 
5 years 
     -0.09*** -0.01 
Rate of voluntary 
resignations 
      0.16*** 
 
 
                                                 
5 Two-way correlations for all sectors.  Significance levels calculated using Pearson Correlation Coefficients.  
*** significant at 0.01 level; ** significant at 0.05 level; * significant at 0.10 level.   
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Table 3 – Management Questionnaire descriptive statistics for dependent variables 
 All sectors – proportion of responses in each category 
 Financial performance 
Labour 
productivity 
Quality of product 
or service 
A lot better than average 12.8 10.4 23.1 
Better than average 35.8 32.7 47.4 
About average 31.5 36.1 19.7 
Below average 5.7 3.1 1.9 
A lot below average 0.7 0.5 0.5 
No comparison possible 8.8 11.4 5.1 
Relevant data not available 4.7 5.8 2.7 
    
 
Change in labour 
productivity over 
five years 
Change in how 
hard people work 
over past five 
years 
Labour costs 
relative to other 
costs compared 
with five years 
ago 
Gone up a lot 38.8 39.7 27.4 
Gone up a little 37.9 37.4 42.4 
Stayed the same 18.8 21.0 18.3 
Gone down a little 3.5 1.6 8.2 
Gone down a lot 1.0 0.4 3.6 
    
  All sectors – mean per cent per year 
Standard Error 
    
Voluntary resignations rate  17.5 0.89 
Absenteeism rate (per year)  4.6 0.38 
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Table 4 – Survey of Employees descriptive statistics for dependent variables 
 All sectors – proportion of responses in each category 
 
Feel loyal to 
employer 
Proud to tell 
people who 
work for 
Share 
values of 
employer 
Managers 
understanding 
of family 
responsibilities 
Strongly agree 15.7 16.5 8.3 8.9 
Agree 50.0 40.4 43.5 45.9 
Neither agree nor disagree 23.4 31.4 33.3 24.6 
Disagree 7.5 7.7 11.5 13.7 
Strongly disagree 3.3 3.9 3.4 6.8 
Don’t know 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
     
    Satisfaction 
with pay 
Very satisfied    11.4 
Satisfied    47.4 
Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied    26.0 
Dissatisfied    12.0 
Very dissatisfied    3.2 
Don’t know    0.0 
 
 
Table 5 – Proportion of workplaces with family-friendly policies6 
 Proportion of 
workplaces with 
family-friendly policy 
from workplaces with 
four or more equal 
opportunities policies 
Proportion of 
workplaces with 
family-friendly policy 
from workplaces with 
one or no equal 
opportunities policies 
Parental leave 53.3 20.0 
Working from home 21.1 9.2 
Term-time-only working 25.3 7.1 
Switching from full- to part-time 
employment 
79.5 30.6 
Job-sharing 50.4 11.0 
Workplace nursery 2.7 1.2 
Financia l help with childcare 12.2 2.6 
Paternity leave 53.7 17.1 
Paid time-off for childcare at short-
notice 
66.7 51.8 
Flexitime 28.7 12.8 
4½-day week 3.6 1.9 
                                                 
6 All sectors. 
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Table 6 - Marginal effects7 of workplace characteristics on performance:  Management Questionnaire 
 Financial 
performance 
above-average 
Labour 
productivity 
above-average 
Increase in labour 
productivity over 
previous 5 years 
Employees work 
harder now than a 
year ago  
Quality above-
average 
Relative labour 
costs lower than 5 
years previously 
Rate of voluntary 
resignations 
Absenteeism rate 
 
Parental leave 59.6 35.1 34.7 13.5 25.5* 292.1 67.3 59.2 
Working from home -1.2 9.1 -20.1 -31.5 9.0 198.7** -22.1** -6.0 
Term-time-only working -37.1 -37.2 -21.3 40.7 -12.7 -6.5 32.4 -11.1 
Switching from full-time to part-
time employment -42.6** 21.5 26.0* 11.9 14.8 5.9 7.0 4.2 
Job-sharing 35.9 -48.7* 34.7* 30.8 -16.0 105.8 14.0 10.1 
Workplace nursery 6.6 -78.3* 33.3 -36.1 -42.7 89.5 -39.3** -81.3** 
Financial help with childcare 123.3** 200.1*** 68.1*** 34.4 39.6*** -7.8 -35.6* 39.5 
Paternity leave 92.9*** 43.6 5.4 -2.4 -10.4 -46.4 -5.1 -15.2 
Paid time-off for childcare at 
short -notice 19.6 13.1 10.0 15.8 -8.9 73.6 -10.1 -26.2* 
Flexitime -2.4 -8.3 34.2* 34.9 23.2* -2.9 -36.8*** -15.2 
4½-day week 14.9 -27.2 60.4** 61.4* -16.3 17.5 -37.5** 27.4 
         
Equal opportunities policy on 
gender 38.4* 23.6 -3.7 -4.3 -10.1 -53.0* -6.5 32.8 
Statistics collected on posts held 
by gender 
-31.9 -54.6** -9.7 -10.8 5.8 20.6 -0.7 44.3 
Monitor promotions by gender -30.7 60.2 -57.5** 42.0 -11.3 69.5 -10.7 -9.4 
Review selection procedures to 
identify discrimination 74.1*** 53.2 17.8 -9.5 17.6 -37.0 -0.6 -33.3** 
Review pay to identify 
discrimination 
6.5 -18.7 22.7 14.9 -7.3 -14.0 10.9 -18.2 
Special procedures to encourage 
applications from women 
returners 
38.9 104.2** -42.2 6.7 12.6 -81.6** 11.8 25.9 
         
Union recognition -8.1 -18.5 30.9* 27.2 -29.9** 182.8** -38.9*** 11.3 
                                                 
8 The marginal effects are calculated by comp aring the value of the dependent variable with a particular policy or characteristic, the continuous variable (in this case, the 
proportion of the workforce that is female) at its mean value, and all the other dummy variables set to zero, with the value of the dependent variable in the absence of the 
policy or characteristic i.e. where the continuous variable takes its mean value and all other policies or characteristics are absent.  To standardize the results so that the effect 
of a particular policy is measured on the same scale across all dependent variables, the change relative to the value of the dependent variable when all the dummy variables 
are set to zero is reported (converted to a percentage). 
Private sector only. 
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 Financial 
performance 
above-average 
(continued) 
Labour 
productivity 
above-average 
(continued) 
Increase in labour 
productivity over 
previous 5 years 
(continued) 
Employees work 
harder now than a 
year ago 
(continued) 
Quality above-
average 
(continued) 
Relative labour 
costs lower than 5 
years previously 
(continued) 
Rate of voluntary 
resignations 
(continued) 
Absenteeism rate 
(continued) 
 
Strategic HRM 36.4* 10.4 -2.0 41.2*** 1.0 3.9 -11.2 21.6 
HRM recruitment methods -1.5 5.4 21.7* -23.0 -3.8 -40.2 -15.7 -5.5 
Most employees in largest 
occupational group (LOG) 
trained in job other than their 
own 
-25.6 18.0 5.2 39.2** 5.1 21.2 -6.4 2.1 
HRM communication methods -22.9 2.0 -21.6 -43.3** -6.8 -44.7 0.9 58.2** 
Performance pay 28.8 39.9 -15.1 13.2 -5.3 9.3 -1.2 -0.6 
         
Collective dispute over past 12 
months -17.4 -64.6 -47.7 -59.8** -42.8** 27.3 19.4 74.6 
ISO9000 56.1* 81.0 -5.7** 27.4 29.1*** 268.8 18.3 116.3 
A lot of variety in job 36.9* 56.4** 10.1 22.3 8.2 -3.7 -1.1 -7.6 
         
Growing product market  68.5*** 12.8 21.2* 38.6*** -12.6 -42.2 -7.2 19.3 
More than half the workforce 
highly skilled 50.3 -1.5 -8.7 13.3 22.4** -48.0 0.9 19.5 
Workplace less than 10 years old 14.9 -1.9 -21.5 3.2 -10.5 -22.7 36.4*** 45.5** 
Proportion of workforce female 82.8* -12.9 -11.2 4.6 -23.4 150.8 -21.6 28.5 
Pay compared with similar 
workers in locality:  cf average         
Below average -43.5 -38.3 5.4 15.3 -0.6 -32.8 19.9 34.4 
Above average  82.9*** 81.7*** 25.8* -8.4 4.3 -38.0 -13.2 4.2 
Size of workplace:  cf 10-24 
employees         
25-49 employees 29.4 19.3 -10.7 18.0 0.8 237.4** -30.6*** 1.1 
50-99 96.0* 132.2* -0.6 19.3 -56.1 567.5*** -93.9 -49.7 
100-199 -21.6 7.8 9.8 0.6 6.2 205.9** -17.1 13.4 
200-499 -5.0 34.7 36.2* -4.8 14.7 369.2*** -19.1 16.7 
500+ 4.6 24.1 27.8 15.2 -8.9 672.9*** -2.1 32.9 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 717 703 707 715 743 711 712 661 
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Table 7 – Marginal effects of workplace characteristics on employee responses:  Dependent variables from the Survey of Employees8 
 Satisfied with pay Loyal Proud  Managers understanding of 
family responsibilities 
Employee shares values of 
organisation 
Parental leave 20.0*** -4.3 -4.7 -4.1 -15.0 
Working from home 14.8** 5.4* 9.0* 3.3 5.5 
Term-time-only working -10.5 1.1 -10.4* -10.3* -12.4* 
Switching from full-time t o 
part-time employment -6.4 -0.2 -5.7 5.9* 0.6 
Job sharing -1.5 -4.7 0.4 2.4 8.4* 
Workplace nursery 22.5* 7.2 33.1** -2.0 18.3* 
Financial help with childcare -12.1 -1.4 -0.9 -7.9 -4.2 
Paternity leave -2.4 2.0 2.1 0.5 2.3 
Paid time-off for childcare at  
short -notice 6.8 2.0 6.3* 3.0 7.8* 
Flexitime 4.3 7.6** 8.5 11.1*** 12.9** 
4½-day week -7.4 -5.8 -4.6 -5.2 -12.7 
      
Equal opportunities policy on 
gender -8.3 -2.1 1.5 -2.3 3.2 
Statistics collected on posts 
held by gender -3.9 -0.7 -2.7 5.5 6.0 
Monitor promotions by gender 4.7 -2.5 2.0 1.1 -10.9* 
Review selection procedures to 
identify discrimination 24.0*** 5.0* 7.7* 2.3 9.7* 
Review pay to identify 
discrimination 1.3 -2.0 0.9 0.8 6.2 
Special procedures to 
encourage applications from 
women returners 
-0.9 0.9 11.5* 4.7 8.7 
      
Union recognition -1.4 -7.4*** -13.9*** -8.7*** -14.3*** 
 
                                                 
8 Private sector only. 
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 Satisfied with pay (continued) Loyal (continued) Proud (continued)  Managers understanding of 
family responsibilities 
(continued) 
Employee shares values of 
organisation (continued) 
Strategic HRM -2.2 2.4 -0.7 2.1 1.4 
HRM recruitment methods -6.1 -0.1 1.7 -2.9 -0.5 
Most employees in LOG 
trained in job other than their 
own 
7.8 -0.9 -0.2 5.1 1.7 
HRM communication methods -4.2 1.7 5.4 -0.6 6.1 
Performance pay 2.9 -1.2 -2.2 -9.3*** 0.0 
      
Collective dispute over past 12 
months -2.5 -1.4 -5.8 -15.9*** -7.9 
ISO9000 0.7 -0.5 1.8 5.5* 3.9 
A lot of variety in job -3.9 2.6 8.8** 0.9 6.1 
      
Growing product market  7.3 2.3 3.9 2.2 6.1 
More than half the workforce 
highly skilled 3.4 2.1 7.1 -6.0 6.9 
Workplace less than 10 years 
old 3.0 -1.8 -4.0 -19.8 2.8 
Proportion of workforce female 45.1*** 9.4* 16.3* 15.8** 4.7 
Pay compared with similar 
workers in locality:  cf average      
Below average 11.6** 0.9 7.6** -2.0 4.9 
Above average -14.8* -0.9 1.0 -1.2 -0.4 
Size of workplace:  cf 10-24 
employees      
25-49 6.4 -5.7 -2.5 -5.9 -7.4 
50-99 83.0 -28.1 3.3 -20.5* 17.4 
100-199 0.8 -4.9 0.5 -10.3 -8.8 
200-499 -4.8 -4.7 -0.5 -20.4*** -18.7** 
500+ 13.8 -7.4 0.1 -21.7*** -13.1 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9394 9265 9310 9064 8886 
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Table 8 – Benchmarking for workplaces with all, or no family-friendly policies - 
Management Questionnaire  
 Typical 
workplace 
All family-
friendly 
policies9 
No family-
friendly 
policies10 
Financial performance 0.59 0.97 0.55 
Labour productivity 0.47 0.44 0.43 
Increase in labour productivity 0.81 1.00 0.68 
Employees work harder than 5 
years ago 
0.80 1.00 0.69 
Quality of product or service 0.82 0.99 0.74 
Relative labour costs fallen 0.05 0.26 0.04 
Quit rate 15.0 1.9 17.1 
Absenteeism rate 2.6 0.7 2.5 
 
 
Table 9 – Benchmarking for workplaces with all, or no family-friendly policies – Survey 
of Employees 
 Typical 
workplace 
All family-
friendly policies 
No family-
friendly policies 
Satisfied with pay 0.35 0.47 0.31 
Loyal  0.65 0.69 0.67 
Proud to tell people who work 
for 
0.56 0.73 0.54 
Managers understanding of 
family responsibilities 0.52 0.45 0.52 
Share values of organisation 0.48 0.56 0.45 
 
 
                                                 
9 All other variables at weighted means for workplace with six or more family-friendly policies from the list of 
11.  The means for workplaces with six or more family-friendly practices were used as a proxy for a highly 
family-friendly workplace. 
10 Variables at weighted means for workplace with no family-friendly policies. 
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Table 10 - Benchmarking by likely career impact of family-friendly policies – 
Management Questionnaire  
 Greater-visibility family-
friendly policies only 
Reduced-visibility family-
friendly policies only 
Financial performance 0.95 0.45 
Labour productivity 0.49 0.26 
Increase in labour productivity 1.00 0.83 
Employees work harder than 5 
years ago 0.98 0.90 
Quality of product or service 0.98 0.76 
Relative labour costs fallen 0.14 0.21 
Quit rate 1.46 19.9 
Absenteeism rate 1.1 2.2 
 
 
Table 11 – Benchmarking by likely career impact of family-friendly policies – Survey of 
Employees 
 Greater-visibility family-
friendly policies only 
Reduced-visibility family-
friendly policies only 
Satisfied with pay 0.38 0.34 
Loyal  0.70 0.66 
Proud to tell people who work 
for 0.74 0.53 
Managers understanding of 
family responsibilities 
0.47 0.50 
Share values of organisation 0.52 0.48 
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Appendix 
 
A.1  Dependent variables 
Management 
Questionnaire  
Variable Description 
Financial performance Assessment of workplace financial performance relative to average for establishments in same industry 
Labour productivity Assessment of labour productivity relative to average for establishments in same industry 
Quality Assessment of quality of product or service relative to average for establishments in same industry 
Change in labour 
productivity 
Whether labour productivity has risen or fallen compared with five years ago 
Change in how hard 
people work 
Whether there has been a change in how hard people work compared with five years ago. 
Change in labour costs 
as a proportion of total 
costs 
Whether relative to all other costs, labour costs have increased or decreased compared with five years ago  
Rate of voluntary 
resignations 
Number of permanent employees (full-  and part-time) who left or resigned voluntarily over the last twelve 
months as a proportion of the current workforce 
Absenteeism rate Proportion of working days lost through employee sickness or absence over the past year (excluding authorized 
leave of absence, employees away on secondment or courses and days lost through industrial action).   
  
Survey of Employees  
Satisfaction with pay Assessment of how satisfied the employee is with the amount of pay they receive 
Feel loyal to employer Level of agreement with the statement “I feel loyal to my organization” 
Proud to tell people 
who work for 
Level of agreement with the statement “I am proud to tell people who I work for” 
Managers 
understanding of family 
responsibilities 
Level of agreement with the statement “Managers here are understanding about employees having to meet family 
responsibilities” 
Share values of 
employer 
Level of agreement with the statement “I share many of the values of my organization” 
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A.2  Independent variables – Management Questionna ire 
Parental leave Whether any non-managerial employees are entitled to parental leave 
Working from home Whether any non-managerial employees are entitled to work at or from home in normal working hours 
Term-time-only 
working 
Whether any non-managerial employees are entitled to term-time-only contracts 
Switching from full- to 
part-time employment 
Whether any non-managerial employees are entitled to switch from full-time to part-time employment 
Job-sharing Whether any non-managerial employees are entitled to job sharing schemes 
Workplace nursery Whether any non-managerial employees are entitled to use a workplace nursery or nursery linked with the 
workplace 
Financial help with 
childcare 
Whether any non-managerial employees are entitled to financial help/subsidy to parents for childcare 
Paternity leave Written policy giving male employees entitlement to specific period of leave when their children are born.  
Paid time-off for 
childcare at short-notice 
If an employee needed to take a day off at short notice, they would generally take this time off as sick leave, 
special paid leave or as annual leave.   
Flexitime Flexitime for any non-managerial employees in the workplace 
4½-day week 9-day fortnight or 4½ day week for any non-managerial employees in the workplace  
Equal opportunities 
policy on gender 
Formal written policy on equal opportunities or managing diversity which specifically addresses equality of 
treatment on the grounds of gender 
Statistics collected on 
posts held by gender 
Statistics are collected on the posts held by men and women 
Monitor promotions by 
gender 
Promotions are monitored by gender, ethnicity etc. 
Review selection 
procedures to identify 
discrimination 
Selection and other procedures are reviewed to identify indirect discrimination 
Review pay to identify 
discrimination 
The relative pay rates of different groups are reviewed 
Special procedures to 
encourage applications 
from women returners 
When filling vacancies, special procedures are used to encourage applications from women returning to work 
after having children 
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A.2  Independent variables – Management Questionnaire (continued) 
Union recognition At least one union recognized by management for negotiating pay and conditions for any section of the workforce 
Strategic HRM Formal strategic plan which covers employee development and forecasts staffing requirements, with someone 
responsible for employee relations involved in preparation of the plan 
HRM recruitment 
methods 
Use of personality or performance tests in recruitment, or recruitment based on skills, qualifications, experience 
or motivation but not references, availability, recommendation by another employee, or age 
Most employees in 
LOG trained in job 
other than their own 
60 per cent or more of the largest occupational group formally trained to be able to do jobs other than their own 
HRM communication 
methods 
Consultative committee of managers and employees which discusses a range of issues; quality circles; and regular 
briefings for some of the workforce. 
Performance pay Individual or group performance pay, profit-related pay, deferred profit-sharing, or employee share ownership.   
Collective dispute over 
past 12 months 
Whether there was a collective dispute with any group of workers over pay or conditions over the past 12 months 
ISO9000 Workplace has attained either BS5750 or ISO9000 
A lot of variety in job Rating of the extent to which individual employees in the largest occupational group have variety in their work 
Growing product 
market 
Market for main product or service is currently growing 
More than half the 
workforce highly 
skilled 
More than 50 per cent of workforce in the managerial, professional or technical occupations 
Workplace less than 10 
years old 
Age of workplace less than 10 years old 
Proportion of workforce 
female 
Number of female employees in workforce as proportion of total workforce 
Pay compared with 
similar workers in 
locality 
Size of most recent pay increase compared with similar workers in the locality 
Size of workplace Number of employees 
Industry dummies Major group industrial sector 
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